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1 Introduction
The sustainability of public finances is a major concern in many countries, due to
aging populations and lower fertility rates. In the Netherlands, these phenomena
are expected to increase the age-dependency ratio1 from 32 percent in 2019 to 51
percent in 2040 (Statistics Netherlands, 2019). To alleviate the financial pressure
such developments exert on the pension system, the Dutch government implemented
numerous reforms over the past decades. An emblematic example is the reform of
the statutory retirement age of the Dutch public pension system, the AOW-age
(Algemene Ouderdomswet leeftijd). While the AOW age was fixed at 65 up to
and including 2012, it started increasing stepwise from 2013 onward. With this
reform, the government intends to improve the sustainability of public finances, by
reducing expenditures on social security and increasing income tax receipts from
higher participation of the elderly. However, the implementation of this reform can
also bring about adverse effects. Older workers tend to have weaker employment
opportunities, which may render them unable to continue to work. Furthermore,
workers that would normally have retired at the old statutory retirement age may
substitute towards other social security programs. This may limit the savings on
social benefits and the additional tax revenues.
In this paper we exploit the recent cohort-based changes in the statutory re-
tirement age in the Netherlands to study the effect on employment and the use of
different types of social insurance. Furthermore, we also estimate the net effect of
these changes on the government budget, accounting for behavioral effects.
We study the effects of this reform using a differences-in-differences design, ex-
ploiting the cohort-based shift in the retirement age. We estimate the effect of the
reform on the probability of being in retirement, employment and other states in the
labor market such as disability or unemployment insurance. We use administrative
data on different types of income for the universe of the Dutch elderly population.
This data also allows us to study the effects of the reform on the government budget,
taking into account behavioral effects. Precise estimates for a large set of placebo
treatment dummies before the actual shift in the statutory retirement age show that
we cannot reject that the treatment and control cohorts share common time effects.
Also, we show how one can convert the estimates of the differences-in-differences
model into an effect on the average retirement age and average claiming age. Fur-
thermore, we compare the estimated effects of the differences-in-differences design
with the estimated effects using a regression discontinuity design.
1Defined as the number of indviduals 65 years of age and older over the number of individuals
20 to 64 years of age.
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Our main findings are as follows. First, we find a strong drop in the share of
individuals in retirement at the old retirement age (–51 percentage points), reflecting
the importance of the AOW in shaping retirement behavior in the Netherlands.
Second, one third of this drop in retirement results in an increase in employment
(+16 percentage points), and more than one third results in an increase in various
types of social benefits (+20 percentage points), disability benefits in particular. In
our dataperiod we find hardly any evidence of active substitution – for example,
individuals moving from employment to disability or unemployment – following
the reform. Individuals merely remain in their previous state longer when the
retirement age increases. Third, a shift in the statutory retirement age by 3 months
increases the average claiming age by 1.8 months according to both the DID and
RDD models, and increases the average retirement age by 1 month (DID) to 1.3
months (RDD). Finally, about 47% of direct savings on retirement (AOW) benefits
is lost to additional expenditures on social insurance benefits, whereas additional tax
receipts are in the order of 28% of direct savings on retirement benefits. This leaves
a net effect of 81% of the direct savings on retirement benefits for the government
budget.
Our analysis relates to the growing body of literature analyzing the effect of
reforms of the early retirement age (ERA) and normal retirement age (NRA). As
pension claiming at the AOW is universal and automatic, with a fixed amount that
is unrelated to labor supply decision, it shares characteristics with both types of re-
tirement ages. Evaluations of shifts in the ERA, pioneered by Staubli & Zweimüller
(2013) for Austria,2 find strong effect on retirement and employment, as well as
important substitutions effects towards social insurance schemes. Despite some
variations in the point estimates, the results are qualitatively consistent across the
literature: individuals stay longer in their initial state when the ERA increases,
hence employment effects are increasing with the share of the population retiring
exactly at the ERA. Similar results are found in the case of an increase in the NRA:
increases in the average retirement age, pioneered by Mastrobuoni (2009) for the
US, are largely driven by shifts in the bunching in retirement at the NRA age (see
also Behaghel & Blau, 2012).3
We make the following contributions to this literature. We provide a clean and
global assessment of the effects of the increase in the AOW reform. We improve on
2Other studies include Atalay & Barrett (2015) for Australia, Cribb et al. (2016) for the UK,
Seibold (2017) and Geyer & Welteke (2019) for Germany, Manoli & Weber (2018) for Austria and
Rabaté & Rochut (2019) and Rabaté (2019) for France.
3This shift in the retirement distribution following a change in the NRA is also documented
by Brown (2013), Seibold (2017) and Lalive et al. (2017).
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De Vos et al. (2018), who recently estimated the effects of the reform on employment
using DID and survey data from the Dutch Labor Force Survey, by estimating the
effect of the reform on a wide range of outcomes, making use of the full universe
of the Dutch population and calculating the effects on the government budget. We
also make some useful methodological contributions to the literature. We first build
a framework for the computation of the effect of the reform on average retirement
and claiming age, which are key parameters of interest for policymakers but cannot
be directly inferred from the differences-in-differences estimates. We also compare
the DID results with estimates from a RDD, both for the effect around the statutory
retirement age and the effect on the average retirement age. This paves the way for
a more comprehensive comparison of the different results found in the literature.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on bunching close to the retirement age.
We find that the bunching at the retirement age shifts with the retirement age.
Since the shift in the retirement age is essentially a wealth effect, this suggests that
norms, job protection and/or liquidity constraints play an important role in shaping
retirement behavior in the Netherlands.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give an
overview of the institutional context, the retirement-age reform and reforms in early
retirement and social insurance schemes that could potentially interfere with our
analysis. Section 3 outlines the empirical methodology, discusses the data used
in the analysis and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents graphical
evidence on the effects of the reform, regression results, a number of robustness
checks and the effects of the reform for the government budget. Section 5 discusses
our findings and concludes. An appendix contains supplementary material.
2 Institutional setup and reforms
The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars, which together allow workers
to accumulate pension rights in the order of 70% of their average gross wage for
retirement (Knoef et al., 2017).
The first pillar consists of pay-as-you-go old age pension benefits (AOW, Al-
gemene Ouderdomswet). Individuals accumulate 2 percent of the full first pillar
pension per year of residence in the Netherlands (up to a maximum of 100% of
the full benefit). The benefits are linked to the social minimum and also depend
on partnership status (a retired single person gets 70% of the social minimum, a
retired couple gets 100% of the social minimum).4 Individuals start receiving the
4On July 1st 2019, the (gross) AOW for a single person was EUR 1,228 and for a couple it was
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first pillar pension once they have reached their birth-cohort specific ‘AOW age’.
Individuals cannot bring any first pillar pension benefits forward when they retire
earlier. Furthermore, at the AOW age, employment contracts end by law and need
to be renewed if an individual worker wants to continue to work. Also, beyond the
AOW age individuals are no longer eligible for benefits from other social insurance
programs like unemployment insurance and disability insurance.
The second pillar consists of firm- and sector-specific occupational funded pen-
sion schemes. The benefits from the second pillar supplement the first pillar benefits.
Pension savings in the second pillar depend on an individual’s wage income and the
pension arrangement that is provided by the firm or sector. Employees and em-
ployers pay monthly premiums to the pension fund of the respective firm or sector.
These premiums are paid over a certain income threshold and exempt from income
taxation up to a maximum income threshold (EUR 107,543 in 2019), and there is no
wealth tax on second pillar pension savings. The second pillar pension benefits are
indexed to average wages, although indexation may be stalled, or benefits may even
be reduced, when the assets of the pension fund drops below a certain percentage of
its projected future obligations.5 Individuals can decide to retire earlier (or later),
before the AOW age, and bring part of the second pillar pension benefits forward,
with an actuarial fair reduction (increase) in the monthly benefits (De Vos et al.,
2018).
The third pillar consists of individual savings for retirement. Individuals can
accumulate 1.875% of their average wage income for the expected retirement period
per year tax free, via earmarked personal savings or life insurance schemes. Over a
working life of 40 years this amounts to 75% of the average wage income.
Knoef et al. (2017) calculate replacement rates for a representative sample of
the Dutch population, combining data on first, second and third pillar pension in
the Income Panel dataset of Statistics Netherlands. The median replacement rate
of expected retirement income from first and second pillar pensions for individuals
60–65 years of age when they turn 67 is 68 percent.6 39 percentage points come
from the first pillar and 29 percentage points come from the second pillar. Adding
third pillar pension savings and other assets (including housing wealth), raises the
EUR 1,688 (www.svb.nl).
5Indeed, many pension funds have not fully indexed benefits to wage growth following the finan-
cial crisis and the drop in interest rates, raising the discounted value of future pension obligations,
and may be forced to cut benefits in the near future (CPB, 2019).
6They calculate an annuity based on all income and assets projected to be available to the
individual at the age of 67, and divide this by gross primary income observed at the age the
individual is observed.
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median replacement rate to 82 percentage points.7 There is substantial variation
in the replacement rate, ranging from 62 percent at the 25th percentile of the
distribution to 106 percent at the 75th percentile of the distribution (Knoef et al.,
2017, Table 4). The replacement rate is higher for individuals with a relatively low
household income and for employees (when compared to self-employed) (Knoef et
al., 2017, Table 11), and slightly higher for immigrants (due to their relatively low
primary income) and singles (Knoef et al., 2017, Table 12).
At the introduction of the first pillar pension in the Netherlands in 1957, the
retirement age was set at 65. This continued to be the retirement age all the way
up to the end of 2012. In 2011, faced with public finances that were no longer
sustainable in the long run, the Dutch government adopted a reform package that
included an increase in the AOW age from 2013 onwards (see Table 1). The second
column shows the planned increase in the AOW age for the different birth cohorts
of the reform announced in 2011. In 2012 this reform was amended to allow the
AOW age to increase at a faster pace from 2015 onward (third column of Table 1).
Furthermore, from 2021 onward the increase in AOW age was linked to the increase
in life expectancy.8 These reforms in the AOW age will be the focus in the analysis
below.
There are a number of related earlier reforms in early retirement schemes and the
second pillar pension system that are relevant as well, see Table 2. These reforms
are important for understanding noticeable upward ‘jumps’ we observe in the birth-
cohort specific labour participation profiles of older workers. Until 2006, workers
could opt for an early retirement scheme several years before the AOW age, which
was financed via a sectoral or firm specific pay-as-you-go system. This scheme was
abolished in 2006, although individuals that would reach the official retirement age
before 2015 could use a compensation scheme called the Life Course Saving scheme
(Levensloopregeling).9 Consequently, cohorts affected by changes in the AOW age
before 2015 are not directly comparable to cohorts affected by changes in the AOW
age from 2015 onwards, as we will see in the next section.10 This is also why we
7The median net income replacement rate is 100 percent, as retired individuals pay less taxes
than working individuals for the same income.
8A new reform was announced in May 2019, and accepted by Parliament in July 2019 (Ministry
of Social Affairs and Employment, 2019). In 2020 and 2021 the retirement age will be kept at 66
years and 4 months (similar to 2019). In 2022 it will increase to 66 years and 7 months. In 2023
it will increase to 66 years and 10 months and in 2024 it will become 67 years (which in the 2012
reform would already happen in 2021).
9The Life Course Saving scheme, offered tax free savings for, amongst other things, retirement
before the AOW age. Saving into this scheme was abolished in 2012, but individuals could still
use the accumulated savings to retire early in years beyond 2012.
10See e.g. Lindeboom & Montizaan (2018) for an analysis of this earlier reform.
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Table 1: Reforms in AOW-age in the Netherlands
Year 2011 reform 2012 reform AOW age Affected birth cohort
2012 - - 65 Before 01-01-1948
2013 1 month 1 month 65+1 month After 31-12-1947 and before 01-12-1948
2014 1 month 1 month 65+2 months After 30-11-1948 and before 01-11-1949
2015 1 month 1 month 65+3 months After 31-10-1949 and before 01-10-1950
2016 2 months 3 months 65+6 months After 30-09-1950 and before 01-07-1951
2017 2 months 3 months 65+9 months After 30-06-1951 and before 01-04-1952
2018 2 months 3 months 66 After 31-04-1952 and before 01-01-1953
2019 3 months 4 months 66+4 months After 31-12-1952 and before 01-09-1953
Source: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2012, 2014).
will focus on the reforms from 2015 onwards in the Results section.
Individuals can also exit the labor force before the AOW age using so-called al-
ternative pathways, most importantly unemployment insurance (UI) and disability
insurance (DI).11 A change in the AOW age may, therefore, lead to increased substi-
tution toward other social security programs (OECD, 2019). It is important to take
these spillover effects into account when assessing the effectiveness of an increase in
the AOW age. Unemployed individuals are entitled to UI if they did not quit their
job and worked at least 26 weeks in the last 36 weeks of employment. The minimal
duration of the UI benefits is three months. The maximum duration of UI benefits
was cut from 5 years to 3 years and 2 months in 2006, and in 2016 it was cut to a
maximum of 2 years (although the last reform will not ‘bite’ in the data period we
consider). The individual receives a benefit that is based on the previously earned
wage. The replacement rate is 75 percent in the first two months, after which it
drops to 70 percent for the remainder of the entitlement to UI. Individuals may also
exit the labour force via DI. An individual is eligible for DI of 75% of the previous
wage when he or she is fully and permanently disabled. When the individual is
partially and/or temporarily disabled, benefits are less generous and depend on the
previous wage, number of weeks worked before, the current wage (if applicable) and
the ‘remaining earnings capability’ of the individual.12 The last major reform of
disability insurance was in 2006, when the system became much more strict, as a
11See CPB (2015) for an overview of the system of social insurance in the Netherlands.
12See e.g. CPB (2015) for further details.
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Table 2: Overview of related reforms
Year First pillar Second pillar and Unemployment Insurance Disability Insurance
early retirement
2006 ER tax exemptions abolished, Reduction of max. Stricter distinction
Life Course Saving Scheme benefit duration between partially, fully
introduced and permanently disabled
2008 Experience rating abolished
2009 Deferred Pension Bonus
introduced
2012 Life Course Saving Scheme
abolished
2013 Gradual increase New calculation of





Source: Jongen (2016) and De Vos et al. (2018) .
distinction was made between fully and permanently disabled persons and partially
and/or temporarily disabled persons (see Koning & Lindeboom, 2015). After this
reform the inflow into DI dropped significantly. Previous studies have shown that
these reforms in UI and DI have reduced participation in these schemes, see e.g.
De Groot & Van der Klaauw (2019) and Koning & Lindeboom (2015), respectively.
However, the different cohorts we focus on in the empirical analysis below would be
affected in much the same way by these reforms, and hence are unlikely to interfere
with our results.
3 Data and empirical strategy
We use administrative data of the universe of the Dutch elderly population for the
period 1999–2017. Our outcome variables are the different states individuals can
be in on and off the labor market. Specifically, individuals are classified according
to their main source of income, e.g. wage income (employees), profit income (self-
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Table 3: Sample description
AOW = 65 y + 3 m AOW = 65 y + 6 m AOW = 65 y + 9 m
Demographic variables
Age 63.99 63.99 63.96
Share single 0.0930 0.0945 0.0952
Share foreigners 0.114 0.0975 0.102
Share female 0.502 0.503 0.504
Share public 0.116 0.116 0.115
Outcome variables
Share retired 0.373 0.315 0.253
Share employment 0.303 0.335 0.368
Share in welfare 0.0298 0.0299 0.0347
Share in unemployment 0.0280 0.0349 0.0416
Share in disability 0.102 0.107 0.117
Share in oth transfers 0.0213 0.0238 0.0261
Number of observations 6893000 6654000 6665000
employed), disability insurance benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, welfare
benefits, pension benefits, other benefits or no income (typically women in couples).
As demographic control variables we have month of birth (to select individuals
into treatment and control groups), gender (male/female), migration background
(with/without) and household position (single/couple). Furthermore, we use infor-
mation on sector of employment (public/private), based on individual’s situation
at age 60.
In the analysis we focus on cohorts born between January 1950 and April 1952
(see below for explanations for this sample selection). We consider the full Dutch
population and have approximately 375 thousand individuals. Table 3 presents
some summary statistics for the different AOW cohorts we consider. While the
shares of employment, unemployment, disability, self-employed and labour force
participation (LFP) are increasing over cohorts, retirement is shown to be decreas-
ing. The remaining outcomes stay fairly equal. In the results of the empirical
analysis we will indicate what part of these changes observed in the outcome vari-
ables across cohorts can be attributed to the AOW reforms.
Following Staubli and Zweimüller (2013), we estimate the effect of the increase
in the AOW by comparing the trajectories for e.g. retirement and employment
of different cohorts facing different AOW ages. Specifically, we use the following
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baseline specification in the differences-in-differences analysis:
yiact = β0 + δc + θa + β1I(age < AOW)iact +X
′
iatβ2 + εiact. (1)
In this specification, δc are AOW cohort dummies and θa are age dummies (in
months). Xiat represent demographic and macroeconomic controls. In our main
specification, we include two cohorts effects, before and after the AOW age, as the
cohort effects exhibit different patterns from both sides of this age.
The parameter of interest is β1, which indicates the difference in the outcome
variable before and after individuals reach the AOW age, between different cohorts.
This parameter can be estimated by including a dummy variable that indicates
the interaction between the age of an individual and the AOW age cohort that he
or she belongs to. In equation (1), the I(age < AOW)iact variable represents this
interaction. This dummy variable equals one for individuals below the AOW age
that is applicable within their cohort, and zero for individuals that have reached
this age. As individuals are affected by the reform at different ages depending on
the cohort, the value of this variable changes over cohorts as well as over time.
Note that the outcomes are binary variables, and we estimate linear probability
model. As a result, β1 can be interpreted as the percentage point difference in the
probability that an individual is in a particular state for a cohort for which the age
is below the AOW age compared to a cohort for which the age is above or equal to
the AOW age.
The key identifying assumption underlying this difference-in-differences strat-
egy is that, conditional on cohort- and age-fixed effects and the demographic and
macroeconomic control variables, in the absence of the reform the outcomes by age
would be similar across cohorts with different AOW ages. If this assumption holds,
β1 can be interpreted causally.
There are some potential identification threats. First, part of the effect we
attribute to the reform could be related to the macroeconomic cycle. Due to the
linear relation between the age, period and cohort, we cannot directly control for
the cycle at the monthly level. One way of accounting for period effects is to test
the sensitivity of the estimation to the inclusion of period-related variables (like
the unemployment rate or yearly dummies), this is done in the robustness analysis
of section 4.2. Second, other reforms that take place at the same period of time
may bias the estimated effect (Rabaté & Rochut, 2019). As explained in section 2,
the main change interacting with the AOW increase is the 2006 really retirement
reform. According to previous studies, this reform had a strong impact of the
average retirement age (e.g. Lindeboom & Montizaan, 2018). This is a problem for
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our identification strategy if it affects the age profile of the outcome variables. Figure
1 shows the employment rate by age for a selection of the cohorts born between
1940 and 1958. We observe large cohort effects: over time, the employment rate
increases steadily, due to a combination of higher initial employment level and the
end of some early retirement schemes, especially at age 60 and 62. We observe a clear
discontinuity in the trend by age before and after the cohorts born in 1950. This is
likely to be driven by the 2006 early retirement reform mentioned in the previous
section. This implies that the parallel trend assumption does not hold for cohorts
born in 1950 or after when compared to cohorts born before 1950. Therefore, in our
main analysis we focus on cohorts born in 1950 or thereafter. For those cohorts, we
expect to have valid pre-trends according to Figure 1. This can be tested formally
by estimating the following fully interacted differences-in-differences specification:
yiact = α0 + δc + θa + α1(δc × θa) +Xiatα2 + εiact, (2)
where we expect the α1 coefficients to be small and statistically insignificant before
the age of the change in the AOW, and significant for the ages a for which different
cohorts c face a different AOW-age.
Note that this test for the absence of effect before the AOW-age is also a test
for the existence of upstream or horizon effects. As discussed in the results section
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below, an increase in the AOW-age can also have employment effects before this
age, as increasing the horizon of retirement can induce both labor demand and
supply changes that can affect e.g. the employment rate (Hairault et al., 2010). We
expect some of the pre-AOW α1 coefficients for employment to be significant in the
presence of (positive) upstream effects.
4 Results
4.1 Graphical evidence
Figure 2 and 3 shows the age profiles for retirement (the share of individuals for
which pension income is the main source of income) and employment (the share of
individuals for which wage or profit income is the main source of income) for the
different birth cohorts grouped by their respective AOW age. We observe a clear
parallel pattern before age 65 and 3 months, and a steep rise and drop, respectively,
beyond this age. Furthermore, the increase and drop appear to shift to the right with
each cohort, suggesting that it moves with the AOW-age. This can be considered
as direct evidence of a causal effect of the AOW-age change on employment and
retirement profiles. With the chosen empirical strategy, we attribute these changes
to the change in the AOW-age. We consider the patterns in Figure 2 and 3 as
supportive of the assumption of common trends for these cohorts. Note that we
also observe some residual bunching at age 65.13
We also observe that not all individuals that postpone retirement end up in
employment. Figure 4 shows which states make up the difference. Individuals
persist in the state of unemployment, disability, welfare or no income. Again, we
see parallel trends before the age of 65 and 3 months (the AOW-age of the control
group), and a sudden drop beyond that age.
4.2 Regression results
Main results
Table 4 gives the regression results for the shift in the AOW-age on the probability
of being in different states in the labor market, using equation (1). All estimates
are statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level. Consistent with the graphical
evidence, we observe a steep drop in the share of individuals that are retired, 51
percentage points on average, for the months in between the old and new AOW-
13This is also observed in the US, see Behaghel & Blau (2012).
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Figure 4: Shares in other workstates by age and AOW-age
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age. The employment rate increases by 16 percentage points (32% of the decrease in
retirement). The share of individuals with as their main source of income disability
benefits, unemployment benefits, welfare benefits and other benefits increases by 11,
3, 3 and 2 percentage points, respectively. Hence, in total, the share of individuals
on (other) social insurance increases by 19 percentage points (38% of the decrease
in retirement). Moreover, the share of individuals that have no other income before
reaching the AOW-age increases by 15 percentage points (30% of the decrease in
retirement).
The reform hence generated important employment effect, but also large sub-
stitution effects towards other social insurance schemes. Those effects are the sum
of two different effects: passive substitution – individuals in disability or unemploy-
ment insurance stay longer in this state instead of retiring – and active substitution
– individuals would change their labor force participation due to the reform and
enter those schemes. We disentangle those two dimension in Section 4.3.
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Table 4: Main result: effect of the increase in the AOW-age
Ret. Emp. Unemp. Dis. Welf. Oth. Noinc
Under AOW -51.34*** 16.24*** 2.582*** 11.57*** 2.383*** 3.180*** 15.38***
(0.563) (0.283) (0.101) (0.136) (0.0642) (0.379) (0.220)
Observations 19975673 19975673 19975673 19975673 19975673 19975673 19975673
Pre-reform mean 20.09 40.27 4.33 12.48 2.7 3.55 16.59
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by month of birth), * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***
p < 0.001. Pre-reform means correspond to the average computed for the treatment cohorts for age group 62–65.
Robustness checks
In this subsection, we present three types of robustness tests. We first test the
sensitivity of our main estimation results to alternative specifications. Next, we
estimate the fully interacted version of the DD model, tesing for common time
effects. Finally, we estimate the effect of the reform using a regression discontinuity
design instead of differences-in-differences.
Table 5 presents a number of robustness checks for employment as the outcome
variable. The different columns correspond to the following models. Column (1)
is the main specification reported in Table 4. Columns (RT1) to (RT3) show that
we get similar results when we add demographic controls and when we cluster the
standard errors by month of birth. Columns (RT4) to (RT6) test for the sensitivity
to time effects and the inclusion of macro-economic variables that capture the state
of the business cycle. Including the unemployment rate as a proxy for the business
cycle, or quarter or year dummies hardly affects the results. Indeed, the results are
very stable over the different types of controls and clustering of the standard error.
Lastly, column (RT7) estimates the model only for the first increase in the AOW
age, from 65 and 3 months to 65 and 6 months. The estimated effect is only slightly
lower for this subpopulation.
Figure 5 presents the estimated coefficients with a full set of interaction terms
with the different cohorts from the age of 63 onwards using equation (2), to test for
common time effects and possible ‘upstream’ effects (where people respond to the
new AOW-age also before the old AOW-age, also known as horizon or distance-to-
retirement effects). The coefficients are small and statistically insignificant before
the age of 65 and 3 months (the AOW-age for the control cohort), and positive and
statistically significant after this age. Hence, we cannot reject that the cohorts with
different AOW-ages share common time effects and that the upstream effects are
14
Table 5: Robustness check: effect on share employed
Ref RT1 RT2 RT3 RT4 RT5 RT6 RT7
Under AOW 16.24*** 16.43*** 16.43*** 16.44*** 16.13*** 16.17*** 16.06*** 15.43***
(0.283) (0.066) (0.172) (0.173) (0.204) (0.169) (0.188) (0.297)
Observations 19975673 19975673 19975673 19975673 19975673 19975673 19975673 13379389
Notes: First column corresponds to the specification used in Table 4.2. The next columns correspond to the seven
robustness tests (see the text for details):
Column (1): Reference model, with demographic and time effect proxy with unemployment rate, different cohort
effects before and after 65 and clustering at the month of birth level.
Column (2): Estimation without controls without clustering
Column (3): Column (2) + clustering.
Column (4): Column (3) + demographic controls.
Column (5): Column (4) + time effect proxy with unemployment rate.
Column (6): Column (5) + quarter dummies.
Column (7): Column (6) + year dummies.
Column (8): Reference model with sample restriction for the first increase in the AOW only.
Figure 5: Robustness check: fully interacted DID, effect on share employed
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limited for these cohorts. The absence of an upstream effect is hard to reconcile with
a standard economic model with a trade-off between income and leisure (see e.g.
Hairault et al., 2010), but it is consistent with the results found in similar settings
(see e.g. Staubli & Zweimüller, 2013). One explanation to the absence of upstream
effects could be that we only measure the short-run effects of the reform, and that
the mechanisms underlying the distance to retirement have effects on younger ages
only in the longer run. However, also for the longer run effects, the evidence on
upstream effects is mixed: Geyer & Welteke (2019) find no upstream effect of a
German reform of the early retirement age announced 10 years in advance, whereas
Carta & De Philippis (2019) find significant labor market effects for middle-aged
women of an Italian reform of the early retirement age.14
Lastly, we estimate the effect of the increase in the AOW-age on the employment
14To explore longer term effect of the reform, Figure C.1 presented in the Appendix shows the
estimated coefficient using equation (2) for younger cohorts. These are cohorts that have not yet
reached their new AOW-age in our data period, with cohort 1951 taken as the control group.
These cohorts faced further increases in the AOW-age, and they were younger when the increase
was announced and therefore had more time to adapt their labor supply decision. For women we
do not observe an upstream effect for these younger cohorts. However, for men we do observe an
increase in the employment probability as early as from the age of 62, which could potentially be
attributed to an upstream effect of the shift in the AOW-age. However, this increase in employment
could also be explained by other factors, such as the macroeconomic cycle (there is a rebound in
employment at this time that may not be captured by our unemployment rate proxy), age-specific
cohort effects or reforms of the second pillar pension. We are not able to distinguish between
those different explanations at this stage. The stability of the estimates to different specifications
for the time effects, shown in Figures C.2, however suggests that macroeconomic conditions do
not drive this result.
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rate using a regression discontinuity design. Using month of birth as the running
variable and the stepwise increases in the AOW-age as treatment we estimate the
effect of the reform on the probability of being employed at different ages. We
provide details on the RDD in Appendix B. Figure 6 presents the estimated effects
of the increase in the AOW, for the two different jumps we consider and for different
ages. We find significant effects of the increase in the employment probability for
the ages directly concerned by the reforms, and only for them. Reassuringly, the
pattern we observe is very similar to the one given by the DID approach in Figure
5. Point estimates seem to be slightly higher with the RDD for the employment
probability (about 20 percentage points). This may be related to the fact that we
compare more similar groups in the RDD, when part of the effect is captured by
the cohort effects in the DID approach.
Effect on the average retirement age
One limitation of the DID estimates is that they only give the causal effect of
the AOW-reform on the probability of being employed, retired, unemployed, etc.
They do not give directly the effect of the reform on the effective retirement age,
which may be a more relevant elasticity parameter for the evaluation of the effect
of pension reforms. We remedy this shortcoming by deriving an effect of the reform
on the average retirement age from our DID estimates.
We use two definitions of the retirement age. The first one corresponds to the
first time pension income becomes your main source of income, which corresponds to
our definition of the retirement state in the estimations. We refer to this definition
as pension claiming, even though pension can be claimed before the moment it
becomes the main source of income. One issue with this definition is that it may
not correspond to the age of withdrawal form the labor force, as some individuals
can stop working before they start to claim their (first and/or) second pillar pension,
e.g. through disability or unemployment insurance. We therefore present results
also for a second definition where retirement corresponds to the month after the
last age with earnings as the main source of income.15
Under some assumptions for the effect of the reform at older ages, we can use the
estimates of the fully interacted differences-in-differences specification to compute
the effects of the reform on the average retirement age for our two definitions of the
retirement age.The methodology is described in detail in Appendix A. The effect of
the reform on the average claiming age can be computed as the sum of coefficients
15We implement this as the first age at which we observe a transition from work to a period of
out of employment for at least 6 months, after the age of 56.
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when estimating equation (2) with the retired workstate as the y variable. Similarly,
the effect of the reform on the average retirement age can be expressed as the sum
of the coefficients when using employment as the outcome. The intuition behind
these results is the following: the DID estimates can be interpreted as the difference
between the cumulative distribution of retirement and claiming age caused by the
change in the AOW, from which we can retrieve the impact on the averages (see
also Mastrobuoni, 2009).
Figure A.1 of Appendix A presents the estimated coefficients and the associ-
ated average claiming and retirement age. A 6 month increase in the AOW-age
increases the average claiming age by 3.5 months and the average retirement age
by 1.1 months (or an elasticity of 0.6 and 0.2 for the claiming and retirement age,
respectively). The effect is then much stronger for the claiming age. This is ex-
pected as individuals already out of the labor force may not be able to go back into
employment as a result of the reform, hence their claiming age may change while
their retirement age is not affected.
In order to assess the robustness of our estimation of the effect of the reform on
the average retirement and claiming age, we compare our differences-in-differences
approach to a regression discontinuity design. Details of the results are presented
in Appendix B. We estimate the effect of the increase in the AOW-age from 65
years and 3 months to 65 years and 6 months using a RDD (Lee & Lemieux, 2010),
with the date of birth (in months) as the running variable, and comparing the
average retirement and claiming age of individuals from both sides of the AOW-
discontinuity. To do so, we need to restrict our sample to individuals for which
both the claiming and retirement age are observed. We find robust effects of the
effect of the reform on the pension claiming age. The results for the retirement
age are more sensitive to the specification (because of the inclusion of controls and
degree of the polynomial used), but are nonetheless positive and significant for most
specifications (Table B.2).
We then compute the effect on average claiming and retirement age using the
DID approach presented above, on the same sample as the one used for the RDD
estimation (see Figure A.2 of Appendix A). Table 6 compares the results obtained
with the two approaches. The reference taken for the RDD estimations is the
specification with controls and second degree polynomial form (Column 3 and 7 of
Table B.2). The results for both methods are very similar regarding the effect of the
reforms on the claiming age. The effect on the retirement age is somewhat larger
for the RDD than for the DID.
Note that our estimates of the effect of the reform on the average retirement
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Table 6: Effect on the average retirement and claiming age: RDD vs. DID estimates
Claiming age Retirement age
DID RDD DID RDD
Effect of the reform (AOW +3m) +1.8 m +1.8 m +1.0 m +1.3m
(4.28) (2.30)
Notes: Results for the DD estimations (resp. RDD estimations) are presented
in Figure A.2 (resp. Table B.2, columns (3) and (7) ) of the Appendix. T-stat
are presented for the RD estimates. We do not compute them for the DID
calculation.
and claiming age are similar in terms of magnitude to the ones found by Manoli &
Weber (2018) for Austria, using a regression kink design. They find an elasticity
of 0.4 for retirement and 0.5 for claiming, for a one year increase in the ERA.
As they restrict to a sample of individuals working at age 53, their result should
be compared to the ones reported in Table B.2, as the sample restriction is more
comparable. For this sample we find an elasticity of 0.33 and 0.6 for the retirement
and claiming age, respectively.
4.3 Additional results
Effects for subgroups
To assess whether the effects differ for subgroups we estimate equation (1) sepa-
rately by gender, for singles and couples, private and public sector employees, and
individuals with and without a migration background. Figure 7 presents the results
graphically.16 We show the effects for all the states on the labor market. The effect
on the probability of being retired is (minus) the sum of the effects on the shares
in the other states (the total height of the bars). The different components of the
bars show how much of the decrease in retirement is accounted for by an increase
in the other states on the labor market.
For men we find a larger increase in the employment share than for women, as
well as a slightly higher increase in the share on disability benefits, unemployment
benefits and other types of benefits. For women we find a larger increase in welfare
and without income. These patterns reflect the differences in participation in the
different states on the labor market in the years before the retirement age, women
are more likely to be out of the labor force, and also build up less second pillar
pension. As a result, there is a stronger effect on the share switching to retirement
16Estimation results are presented in Table C.1 in the Appendix.
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(to pension benefits as the main source of income). Comparing individuals with a
migration background (‘Foreign’)17 to individuals without a migration background
(‘Dutch’) we find quite similar effects for most categories except for a stronger effect
on the participation in welfare, due to a lower attachment to the labor force in the
years before retirement. The results are also quite similar for singles and individu-
als living in couples, though individuals in couples (mostly women in couples) are
more likely to remain the state of no income and singles are more likely to be on
disability benefits and welfare benefits (due to e.g. means testing of welfare ben-
efits). Finally, we estimate equation (1) separately for individuals working in the
private sector and the public sector when they turn 60. This implies that we con-
dition on initial employment, hence the employment effects are by definition much
stronger. Interestingly, the employment effects are stronger in the public sector.
This could be related to a more systematic use of the automatic job termination at
the AOW-age in the public sector than in the private sector.
Active substitution effects
As mentioned above, the increase in the probability of being in other social insurance
schemes generated by the reform we exhibited in the previous subsection is the sum
17Individuals are defined by Statistics Netherlands as having a migration background when one
of the parents was born outside of the Netherlands.
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of passive substitution – individuals in disability or unemployment insurance stay
longer in this state instead of retiring – and active substitution – individuals would
change their labor force participation due to the reform. Even if the former effect
is important to consider, in particular for a global assessment of the fiscal effects of
the reform (see below), the latter is more meaningful as it entails a real behavioral
response to the reform.
To test for active substitution effects, Table 7 shows the estimates for equa-
tion (1) when we condition on the labor market state when individuals turn 65
(a few months before the cohort-specific AOW-age for the different cohorts). All
coefficients for retirement are statistically significant at the one percent level. The
coefficients for retirement are large and negative for all initial states except for indi-
viduals that were initially retired. For all states, the increase in the probability to be
in that same state increases by almost the same amount as the probability to retire
decreases. Thus, the drops in retirement before the AOW-age seem to be induced
by persistence in the previous state instead of substitution towards other states.
Hence, although people retire at a later age, only individuals that were initially
employed remain in the labour force. Individuals that previously were unemployed,
disabled or on other social benefits continue their use of these social security pro-
grams as their main source of income (at least in the data period we observe).
Although many of the other estimates are also significant, these coefficients are all
very close to zero. Hence we can conclude that in the short run there is hardly any
active substitution effect between labor market states due to the reform.
Effect on the government budget
Finally, we quantify the effect of the change in the AOW-age on the government
budget in the data period, by estimating equation (1) with monthly income from
each income sources as the dependent variables (including the zeros). The estimated
coefficients can be interpreted as the difference in the monthly amount received from
a certain source of income by individuals in between the AOW-age of the control
cohort (65 and 3 months) and the new AOW age of the treated cohorts (65 and
6 months and 65 and 9 months, depending on the month of birth). Table 8 gives
the estimated average effects on monthly income, estimated over all individuals.
Unsurprisingly, average income from AOW pensions benefits decreases, whereas
income from employment, unemployment insurance, disability insurance, welfare
and other social insurance programs increases. Again, all coefficients are statistically
significant at the 0.1 percent level.
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Table 7: Substitution effects
t-1 Emp. Ret. Unemp. Dis. Welf. Oth. Noinc
Emp. Under AOW 0.327*** -0.332*** 0.000895*** -0.00141*** 0.0000176 0.000726*** 0.00396***
(626.80) (-765.86) (5.74) (-11.74) (-0.55) (7.15) (19.96)
Nb obs. 6738143 6738143 6738143 6738143 6738143 6738143 6738143
Ret. Under AOW -0.00262*** 0.00381*** 0.0000706 -0.00157*** -0.000309*** 0.000684*** 0.0000950
(-17.98) (18.18) (1.03) (-20.03) (-7.45) (10.43) (1.12)
Nb obs. 5980002 5980002 5980002 5980002 5980002 5980002 5980002
Unemp. Under AOW -0.00448*** -0.653*** 0.654*** 0.000654 0.0000164 0.00253** 0.00147*
(-4.11) (-412.25) (281.55) (-0.74) (-0.09) (3.06) (2.17)
Nb obs. 701546 701546 701546 701546 701546 701546 701546
Dis. Under AOW -0.00328*** -0.722*** 0.000258 -0.000533*** -0.000206*** 0.727*** -0.00139***
(-14.94) (-1275.53) (1.29) (-4.48) (-4.08) (1133.86) (-14.71)
Nb obs. 2186960 2186960 2186960 2186960 2186960 2186960 2186960
Welf. Under AOW 0.000126 -0.587*** 0.000111 -0.00271*** 0.587*** 0.000460** 0.0000672
(-0.42) (-533.01) (1.00) (-12.56) (456.85) (2.79) (0.12)
Nb obs. 632709 632709 632709 632709 632709 632709 632709
Oth. Under AOW 0.000268 -0.639*** 0.000750 0.637*** -0.00217*** 0.000849 0.00223**
(0.25) (-335.55) (-1.01) (260.80) (-8.03) (1.61) (2.66)
Nb obs. 477177 477177 477177 477177 477177 477177 477177
Noinc Under AOW 0.00375*** -0.878*** 0.000202 0.00205*** 0.0000183 0.000281*** 0.872***
(8.24) (-1461.95) (1.24) (9.94) (-0.10) (3.72) (1069.45)
Nb obs. 2841666 2841666 2841666 2841666 2841666 2841666 2841666
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
We can then compute the fiscal substitution effect of the reform as follows.
By shifting the AOW-age up, the government saves 713 euro on AOW-benefits
per person. Of these savings, 227 euro is lost on additional disability benefits,
64 euro on additional unemployment benefits, 18 euro on welfare benefits and 25
euro on other social benefits. In total, 334 euro or 47% of the initial savings is
lost on additional social benefits per person. However, the government also gains
additional taxes levied on additional employment generated by the reform. As we
do not observe taxes but only income, we need an additional assumption to calculate
the additional income tax revenues from the increased income from employment.
We use a marginal tax rate of 45% on the additional employment income.18 We
18In line with previous analysis by CPB, using information from the microsimulation model
MIMOSI.
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Table 8: Effect on average monthly income by source of income
AOW pension Employment earnings Unemp. Dis. Welf. Oth.
Under AOW -713.4*** 438.8*** 63.79*** 226.5*** 18.44*** 25.51***
(0.162) (8.835) (0.676) (0.899) (0.265) (2.125)
Observations 19975673 19975673 19975673 19975673 19975673 19975673
Pre-reform mean .058 1401366 101931 239109 35864 68239
then get an average increase in taxes of 0.45 · 439 = 197 euro or 28% of initial
savings. Hence, after accounting for the additional expenditures and the additional
tax receipts, the government saves 576 euro per month per person. This amounts
to about 81% of the initial savings. For a cohort size of 120 thousand individuals,
this amount to budgetary savings of 210 million euro for a 3-month upward shift in
the AOW-age.
5 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the effects of the increase in the Dutch retirement
age on employment and the use of social insurance of older workers, and also ana-
lyzed the effects on the government budget. We used differences-in-differences and
Dutch administrative data. We find that the reform decreased the share of individ-
uals retirement by some 50 percentage points. Close to one third (16 percentage
points) of these individuals are employed between the old and new retirement age,
whereas more than one third (20 percentage points) are in social insurance (dis-
ability insurance in particular). We do not find evidence of direct substitution:
individuals merely persist in the state they were in before the old retirement age.
Also, we find no upstream effects before the old retirement age in the dataperiod
we consider.19 Regarding the average retirement age, we find that increasing the
statutory retirement age by 3 months results in an increase in the retirement age
by 1.0 (DID) to 1.3 (RDD) months. Regarding the government budget, we find
that both additional spending on social insurance and additional tax receipts are
substantial, and that the net budgetary savings are in the order of 80% of direct
19Both the treatment effect after the old retirement age and the upstream effects before the old
retirement age could be different in the long-run, as individuals have more time to anticipate and
smooth the effects of the shift in the AOW-age. Note that the time between the announcement
of the reform in 2011 and the implementation in 2013 was relatively short, when compared to
reforms abroad.
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savings on retirement (AOW) benefits.
Our results line up well with the findings of studies on related reforms abroad,
see Table C.2 in the Appendix. We compare the results with the findings of studies
on the early retirement age (ERA) and the normal retirement age (NRA), as the
AOW-reform contains elements of both types of reforms. In line with ERA reforms,
individuals can not claim AOW benefits before they reach the AOW age, so liquidity
constraints might be relevant. However, in line with NRA reforms, the AOW reform
is a reform of the statutory retirement age, where norms and employment protection
legislation might also be relevant. The treatment effect we find is on the upper end
of the NRA studies and more in the middle of the ERA studies, where ERA studies
typically find larger effects than NRA studies.
Several policy implications can be derived from these results. So far, it seems
that the increases in the AOW age have been beneficial for problems in terms of age
dependency as described in the Introduction. On the other hand, these results may
only hold true up until a certain age. Even though life expectancy of individuals
is increasing, after a certain point individuals may simply not be able to work due
to, for example, health related reasons. Moreover, although individuals that first
worked remain employed, individuals that were initially unemployed, disabled, had
no income or made use of financial aid or other social security programs remain
in these states longer too. Given the limited period for which some of these social
security benefits can be taken up this may yield financial complications for certain
households, in particular among the most disadvantaged. On the other hand, in-
creasing the AOW could also have longer term upstream effect on employment rate
before 65, which would in turn have positive budgetary effect in the future.
The effect of further increase in the AOW age will also depend on the role
of this age in shaping retirement behavior in the future. The different potential
determinants of the bunching at the AOW – liquidity constraints, norms, employers
effects, financial incentives – may not stay constant over time. Understanding the
relative importance of these channels is an interesting direction for future research.
Also, studying the effects of the reform on a broader set of outcomes, like health
expenditures, would be another interesting direction for future research.
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Appendices
A. Computation of the effect on the average retirement age
This appendix describes the computation of the effect of the reform on the average
claiming age and retirement age. We use the coefficients estimated in the fully
interacted differences-in-differences specification:
yiact = α0 + δc + θat + α1(δc × θat) + α2Xiat + εiact (A.1)
The DID coefficients we are interested in are the βc,a3 coefficients. They give, a given
outcome y, the effect of the increase in the AOW for a given monthly age a and
for a given cohort c, relative to the reference cohort cref with AOW-age equal to 65
years and 3 months.
Effect on the average claiming age We first compute the effect of the reform
on the average claiming age using as an outcome y our definition of retirement
(pension benefits as the main source of income).
βc,a3 coefficients measure the effect of the reform on the probability to have
claimed a pension, and can be interpreted as follows: absent the reform, the prob-
ability of being retired at age a for individual of cohort c would have been -βc,a3
bigger. Formally, if we note XC the random variable of the observed claiming age
for cohort c and XcfC the counterfactual one absent the reform:
P [XcfC ≤ a] = P [XC ≤ a]− β
c,a
3
The effect of the reform on the average retirement age can be defined as the
difference between the observed average retirement age and the counterfactual one,
absent the reform 20, using monthly age in the sum.
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We simply use the following property of the CDF : P [X = a] = P [X ≤ a] −
P [X ≤ a− 1].
This expression we obtain can be simplified if there is an age amin (resp. amax)
below (resp. above) which there is no effect of the reform (i.e βa,c = 0 for a ≤ amin
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Effect on the average retirement age Similarly, we can compute the effect of
the reform on retirement, that is withdrawal from employment, using the coefficients
obtained by estimating equation A.1 using employment as the y variable.
βc,a3 coefficients measure the effect of the reform on the probability to be em-
ployed, and can be interpreted as follows: with the reform, the probability be
employed at age a, i.e to retire later than age a, is βc,a3 bigger. Formally, if we note
XR the random variable of the observed retirement age for cohort c and X
cf
R the
counterfactual one absent the reform:
P [XR > a] = P [X
cf




Using the same approach as before, and using a symmetric mathematical relation
(P [X = x] = P [X > a− 1]− P [X > a]), we can express the change in the average
























Implementation of the computation The following figures present the effect
of the increase in the AOW-age on the average claiming and retirement age using
the method described above.
Figure A.1 presents the results for the same sample we use in the major parts of
the paper, namely cohorts with AOW increasing from 65 years and 3 months to 65
years and 9 months. We present the coefficients estimated with the fully-interacted
DID specification of equation (A.1), and the average effect obtained by summing
those coefficients. We compute the average effect as the sum of the coefficients
between the former and the new AOW age. It amounts to making the following
restrictions, using the same notations as above : amin = 65.25 and amax = 65.5 or
amax = 65.75 depending on the cohort considered. The first one is testable and
seem verified, as all coefficients are insignificant before 65. The second one is not
testable as we do not observe employment or claiming trajectories beyond age 66.
Figure A.2 presents the same results for the subsample of indivduals used for
the regression discontinuity analysis (see Appendix B for details.)
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Figure A.1: Effect on average claiming age and average retirement age: full sample
(a) Claiming age
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Figure A.2: Effect on average claiming age and average retirement age: sub-sample
for comparison with RD estimation
(a) Claiming age
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B. Regression discontinuity estimation
In this appendix we describe the regression discontinuity design (RDD) approach
used as a complementary approach of the main one used in the empirical analyses:
differences-in-differences (DID)
In our RDD setting, the treatment is still defined as an increase in the AOW-
age within this context. Cutoffs are defined by the discontinuous changed in the
AOW-age, and the running variable is the date of birth of the individuals. More
precisely, the cutoff is the first month of birth from which onward the new AOW
age applies. As all individuals receive the AOW-benefits they have accumulated
once they surpass this cutoff, the set up calls for a sharp RDD. The identifying
assumption of this approach is that the month in which individuals are born is
random and, therefore, individuals around the cutoff are similar to the extent that
their retirement decisions should be comparable. In essence, the only thing that is
expected to differ between these individuals is the AOW age that they are subjected
to. As a result, any discontinuity in the outcome variable at the cutoff is attributed
to being treated.
We estimate two types of RDD models. In the first set of estimations, the
outcome variable is the probability of being employed or retired and different age.
We expect a discontinuous change at the AOW cutoff, only at the ages concerned
by the increase in the AOW-age. In the second set of results we estimate the effect
of discontinuity in the AOW-age on the average retirement and claiming age.
Formally, we estimate the following models:




βd,bef (xi − T0)d + βd,aft ×Di × (xi − T0)d
Yi is either employment rate at different age or individual retirement age. Zi are
control variables, Di a dummy for being born after the threshold, T0 the birth-date
based threshold, xi the birth-date (in month), and dmax the highest degree of the
polynomial included in the estimation. The bandwidth of each RD is determined
by the size of the birth cohorts that belong to the control and the treatment group
RDD estimation on the effect on employment rate
We first analyze the effect of the increase in the AOW-age on the employment at
different ages. We estimate our RDD models separately for each monthly age and
for the two jumps in the AOW-age we consider. Table B.1 below summarizes the
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Table B.1: Treated and untreated cohorts by RDD
Control AOW-age Treated AOW-age
RD1 After 31-10-1949 and before 01-10-1950 65 + 3 months After 30-09-1950 and before 01-07-1951 65 + 6 months
RD2 After 30-09-1950 and before 01-07-1951 65 + 6 months After 30-06-1951 and before 01-04-1952 65 + 9 months
cohorts that are on the left and right sides of the cutoff for the estimation. Note
that the cohort on the right on the cutoff for the first discontinuity is the one on
the left for the second one.
Estimation results are presented in figure B.1, which shows the estimated τ co-
efficient of the RDD equation, for all ages and for the two AOW jumps we consider.
As expected, we find insignificant effects for the ages that are not impacted by the
change in the AOW-age. The employment rate is estimated to increase by around
20 percentage points with the increase in the AOW-age. It is roughly similar for
the two discontinuities we consider.
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RD estimation on the effect on average retirement age
We then estimate the effect of the change in the AOW age on the individual average
retirement age. We use two definitions of retirement: claiming age - when pension
is your main source of income and actual retirement - age of withdrawal from the
labor force (see section 4.2 for details). Estimating the effect of the reform on the
average claiming and retirement age requires to be able to observe those processes
33























Birth date in month
 ● claiming retirement














1950.0 1950.5 1951.0 1951.5
Birth date in month
 ● claiming retirement
for every individual of our sample. We then face two types of censoring: from the
left, with individuals who have already retired or claiming at 56, and to the right
for individuals we do not observe retiring before the last date of observation (2016
and 6 months with our definition of retirement). In the following we then restrict
our sample for which we observe retirement and claiming for the age (56 to 66) and
years (2001-2016) we consider.
Figure B.2 present the evolution of the claiming and retirement by month of
birth. We observe the following pattern. First, the average retirement age is lower
than the average claiming age. Second, we observe seasonality in both process with
an discontinuity in January even absent any reform, which is related to a bunching
in retirement observed in the month of January. Lastly, we can observe the effect of
the AOW reform on the right panel. On the left panel, we can compare this effect
to the effect of the second pillar reform in 2006 (from January 1950), which appears
to have a much stronger effect.
Figure B.3 presents the average by month of birth for claiming and retirement
respectively. We observe a jump for both definitions. As the change occurs for
individuals born in October, the estimation of the cohort effect on the right hand
side of the discontinuity is complicated by the interaction with the January effects.
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Table B.2 presents the estimated coefficient of the τ parameter of the RDD
equation, for a 3 months increase in the AOW-age at the threshold. The model
is estimated for two different outcomes: individual claiming age (columns 1 to 4)
and retirement age (columns 5 to 8). For each set of models we estimate different
specifications: with and without controls, and for polynomials of degree 1, 2 or 3.
The estimated effect of on the average claiming age is rather robust across the
different specification: a 3 months increase in the AOW leads to a 1.8 to 2.1 months
increase in the average claiming age. Results for average retirement are on the other
hand less robust: they are much more sensitive to the specifications used (inclusion
of controls and degree of the polynomial function), and less precisely estimated (not
significant at conventional levels for the last model). This may be related to the
somehow noisy measure of retirement we use.
Interestingly, the estimated effect of the reform is of similar magnitude as the
ones obtained with the differences-in-differences approach (Figure A.2).
Figure B.3: RDD graphs for average claiming and retirement age
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Table B.2: Estimation of the effect of the reform by RDD
Y = claiming age Y = retirement age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment effect τ 2.050∗∗∗ 2.050∗∗∗ 1.813∗∗∗ 1.836∗∗ 1.671∗∗∗ 1.671∗∗∗ 1.283∗ 1.075
(7.63) (7.63) (4.28) (2.78) (4.74) (4.74) (2.30) (1.24)
N 157235 157235 157233 157233 157235 157235 157233 157233
Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Degree polynomial 1 2 2 3 1 2 2 3
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Columns (1) to (4) correspond to the RDD estimation with claiming
age as an outcome variables, for different control variables and specification
for the polynomial functions. Columns (5) to (8) present the same results for
retirement age.
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C. Additional plots and tables
Table C.1: Heterogeneity analysis
Emp. Ret. Unemp. Dis. Welf. Oth. Noinc
Gender
Men Under AOW 18.94*** -42.18*** 3.157*** 12.81*** 2.313*** 2.733*** 2.239***
(N=9930268) (60.37) (-75.25) (23.65) (53.39) (6.94) (29.53) (28.14)
Pre-reform mean 49.4 22.3 5.4 13.5 2.7 3.3 3.4
Women
(N=10045405) Under AOW 13.62*** -60.36*** 2.016*** 10.36*** 4.034*** 2.038*** 28.29***
(43.27) (-104.73) (22.46) (88.86) (9.48) (35.14) (73.20)
Pre-reform mean 31.2 17.9 3.3 11.5 4.4 2.1 29.6
Sector
Public Under AOW 29.14*** -36.83*** 2.351*** 3.049*** 0.00880 0.634*** 1.641***
(N=1257765) (68.55) (-73.62) (9.59) (20.09) (0.57) (5.91) (11.78)
Pre-reform mean 67.1 24.3 3.3 3.0 0.0 1.0 1.3
Private
(N=9507995) Under AOW 27.13*** -43.26*** 4.874*** 4.731*** 0.325*** 2.064*** 4.139***
(110.58) (-88.63) (28.71) (40.03) (11.54) (33.24) (28.86)
Pre-reform mean 60.4 22.0 7.1 4.5 0.5 1.7 4.0
Origin
Autochtone Under AOW 16.49*** -50.24*** 2.576*** 11.15*** 1.958*** 2.291*** 15.78***
(N=17981165) (76.45) (-115.72) (24.65) (64.37) (44.04) (64.86) (85.71)
Pre-reform mean 40.1 20.8 4.4 12.0 2.4 2.7 16.8
Foreign
(N=1994508) Under AOW 14.45*** -60.61*** 2.629*** 14.97*** 13.23*** 3.236*** 12.06***
(11.34) (-33.74) (16.65) (17.35) (5.75) (10.39) (11.26)
Pre-reform mean 33.4 12.2 4.1 16.7 15.0 3.0 15.5
Marital status
Single Under AOW 16.03*** -50.37*** 2.533*** 10.63*** 1.957*** 1.723*** 17.49***
(N=1733936) (57.38) (-85.16) (21.29) (75.91) (5.66) (20.16) (62.88)
Pre-reform mean 41.1 20.6 4.3 11.4 2.1 1.9 18.6
Couple
(N=16665765) Under AOW 16.90*** -54.42*** 2.862*** 17.25*** 8.879*** 4.762*** 3.763***
(44.44) (-99.57) (11.37) (43.30) (14.23) (36.06) (18.16)
Pre-reform mean 37.4 17.9 4.9 18.9 9.9 5.2 5.8
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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● ● ●1953 1954 1955
Figure C.2: Estimated effect of the increase in the AOW-age for cohort 1954, for
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